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Passivity and Evolutionary Game Dynamics
Shinkyu Park, Jeff S. Shamma, and Nuno C. Martins
Abstract— This paper investigates an energy conservation
and dissipation – passivity – aspect of dynamic models in
evolutionary game theory. We define a notion of passivity
using the state-space representation of the models, and we
devise systematic methods to examine passivity and to identify
properties of passive dynamic models. Based on the methods,
we describe how passivity is connected to stability in population
games and illustrate stability of passive dynamic models using
numerical simulations.
I. INTRODUCTION
Of central interest in evolutionary game theory [1], [2]
is the study of strategic interactions among players in large
populations. Each player engaged in a game chooses a strat-
egy among a finite set of options and repeatedly revises its
strategy choice in response to given payoffs. The distribution
of strategy choices by the players define the population state,
and evolutionary dynamics represent the strategy revision
process and prompt the time-evolution of the population
state.
One of main focuses of the study is on analyzing the
population state trajectories induced by evolutionary dynam-
ics to identify asymptotes of the trajectories and establish-
ing stability in population games. This paper contributes
to the study by investigating a passivity – abstraction of
energy conservation and dissipation – aspect of evolutionary
dynamic models (EDMs) specifying the dynamics and by
demonstrating how passivity yields stability in population
games.
The most relevant work in literature investigates various
aspects of evolutionary dynamics and associated stability
concepts in population games. To mention a few, Brown
and von Neumann [3] studied Brown-von Neumann-Nash
(BNN) dynamics to examine the existence of optimal strategy
choices in a zero-sum two-player game. Taylor and Jonker
[4] studied replicator dynamics and established a connection
between evolutionarily stable strategies [5] and stable equi-
librium points of replicator dynamics. Later the result was
strengthened by Zeeman [6] who also proposed a stability
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concept for games under replicator dynamics. Gilboa and
Matshu [7] considered cyclic stability in games under best-
response dynamics.
In succeeding work, stability results are established us-
ing broader classes of evolutionary dynamics. Swinkels [8]
considered a class of myopic adjustment dynamics and
studied strategic stability of Nash equilibria under these
dynamics. Ritzberger and Weibull [9] considered a class of
sign-preserving selection dynamics and studied asymptotic
stability of faces of the population state space under these
dynamics.
In a recent development of evolutionary game theory,
Hofbauer and Sandholm [10] proposed stable games and
established stability of Nash equilibria of these games under
a large class of evolutionary dynamics. The class includes
excess payoff/target (EPT) dynamics, pairwise comparison
dynamics, and perturbed best response (PBR) dynamics. Fox
and Shamma [11] later revealed that the aforementioned
class of evolutionary dynamics exhibit passivity. Based on
passivity methods from dynamical system theory, the authors
established L2-stability of evolutionary dynamics in a gen-
eralized class of stable games. Mabrok and Shamma [12]
discussed passivity for higher-order evolutionary dynamics.
In particular, the authors investigated a connection between
passivity of linearized dynamics and stability in generalized
stable games using robust control methods. Passivity meth-
ods are also adopted in games over networks to analyze
stability of Nash equilibrium [13].
Inspired by passivity analysis presented in [11], we in-
vestigate the notion of passivity for EDMs of evolutionary
dynamics more in-depth. Our main goals are (i) to de-
fine passivity of EDMs that admit realizations in a finite-
dimensional state space; (ii) to develop methods to examine
passivity and to identify various properties of passive EDMs;
and (iii) based on the above results, to establish a connection
between passivity and stability in population games.
A. Summary of the Main Contributions
1) We define and characterize the notions of δ-passivity
for EDMs that admit state-space representation. Based
on the characterization result, we demonstrate how to
examine δ-passivity of EDMs for the replicator dynam-
ics, EPT dynamics, pairwise comparison dynamics,
and PBR dynamics.
2) We investigate certain properties of δ-passive EDMs
with respect to payoff monotonicity and total payoff
perturbation.
3) Based on the above results, we establish a connection
between δ-passivity and asymptotic stability of Nash
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equilibria in population games. We also illustrate the
stability using numerical simulations.
B. Paper Organization
In Section II, we present background materials on evolu-
tionary game theory that are needed throughout the paper.
In Section III, we define δ-passivity of EDMs and present
an algebraic characterization of δ-passivity in terms of the
vector field which describes state-space representation of
EDMs. In Section IV, using the characterization result, we
investigate properties of δ-passive EDMs. In Section V, we
establish a connection between δ-passivity and asymptotic
stability in population games, and present some numerical
simulation results to illustrate the stability. We end the paper
with conclusions in Section VI.
C. Notation
• ai – given a vector a in Rn, we denote its i-th entry as
ai.
• [a]+, [ai]+ – the non-negative part of a vec-
tor a =
(
a1 · · · an
)T
in Rn and its i-th en-
try defined by [a]+
def
=
(
[a1]+ · · · [an]+
)T
and
[ai]+
def
= max{ai, 0}, respectively.
• 1, I, ei – the vector with all entries equal to 1, the
identity matrix, and the i-th column of I , respectively.1
• ∇xf,∇2xf – the gradient and Hessian of a real-valued
function x 7→ f(x) with respect to x, respectively,
provided that they exist.
• DF – the differential of a mapping F : X→ Rn.
• int(X),bd(X) – the (relative) interior and boundary of
a set X in its affine hull, respectively.
• Rn+
(
Rn−
)
– the set of n-dimensional element-wise non-
negative (non-positive) vectors. For n = 1, we omit the
superscript n and adopt R+ (R−).
• ‖ · ‖ – the Euclidean norm.
II. BACKGROUND ON EVOLUTIONARY GAME THEORY
Consider a population of players engaged in a game
where each player selects a (pure) strategy from the set
of available strategies denoted by {1, · · · , n}.2 Suppose
that the population consists of a continuum of players.
The population states, which describe the distribution of
strategy choices by players, constitute a simplex defined
by X def= {x ∈ Rn+ |
∑n
i=1 xi = 1} where xi is a fraction of
population choosing strategy i. Let us denote the tangent
space of X by TX = {z ∈ Rn | ∑ni=1 zi = 0}.
In population games, an element p in Rn, so-called the
payoff vector, is assigned to the population state x by
payoff functions where the i-th entry pi of p represents the
payoff given to the players choosing strategy i. In this work,
we mainly focus on investigating passivity of evolutionary
1We omit the dimensions of vectors and matrices whenever they are clear
from context.
2Population games, in general, account multiple populations of players,
and the strategy sets are allowed to be distinct across populations (see [10]
for details). However, for simple and clear presentation, we restrict our
attention to a single-population case.
dynamic models and briefly demonstrate how passivity yields
stability in population games. For the later purpose, we
consider the payoff functions given below:
1) Static Payoff [10]:
p(t) = F(x(t)) (1)
2) Smoothed Payoff [11]:
p˙(t) = λ(F(x(t))− p(t)) (2)
In (2), we note that at the equilibrium points, it holds
that p(t) = F(x(t)). Throughout the paper, we adopt the
definition of a Nash equilibrium as follows.
Definition II.1: Given a payoff function F : X→ Rn, the
population state xNE ∈ X is a Nash equilibrium of F if it
holds that
xNEi > 0 implies i ∈ arg max
j∈{1,··· ,n}
Fj(xNE)
A. Evolutionary Dynamic Models
Evolutionary dynamics describe how the population state
evolves over time in response to given payoffs and are spec-
ified by evolutionary dynamic models (EDMs). We focus on
EDMs that admit state-space representation of the following
form:
x˙(t) = V(p(t), x(t)), x(0) ∈ X (3)
where p(t), x(t), and x˙(t) take values in Rn, X, and TX,
respectively. We assume that the vector field V : Rn ×X→
TX is well-defined in a sense that it continuously depends
on (p(t), x(t)), and for each initial value x(0) in X and each
payoff vector trajectory p(·) : R+ → Rn in P, there exists
a unique solution x(·) : R+ → X to (3) that belongs to X,
where P and X are defined by
P
def
=
{
p(·)
∣∣∣∣ p(t) ∈ X and ∫ t
0
‖p˙(τ)‖2 dτ <∞ for t ∈ R+
}
X
def
=
{
x(·)
∣∣∣∣x(t) ∈ X and ∫ t
0
‖x˙(τ)‖2 dτ <∞ for t ∈ R+
}
Throughout the paper, we assume that EDMs satisfy the
following path-connectedness condition.
Assumption II.2 (Path-Connectedness): We
define the set of equilibrium points of (3) by
S def= {(p, x) ∈ Rn × X | V(p, x) = 0} and its projection on
Rn × {x} by Sx def= {p ∈ Rn | (p, x) ∈ S} for each x in X.
We assume that the set Sx is path-connected for every x
in X. In other words, for every p0, p1 in Sx, there exists a
piece-wise smooth path from p0 to p1 that is contained in
Sx. 
We list below a few examples of EDMs found in the
literature.
Example II.3: For each i in {1, · · · , n},
1) Replicator Dynamics [4]:
x˙i(t) = xi(t)
(
pi(t)− pT (t)x(t)
)
(4)
2) BNN Dynamics [3]:
x˙i(t) = [pˆi(t)]+ − xi(t)
n∑
j=1
[pˆj(t)]+ (5)
3) Smith Dynamics [14]:
x˙i(t) =
n∑
j=1
xj(t)[pi(t)− pj(t)]+
− xi(t)
n∑
j=1
[pj(t)− pi(t)]+ (6)
4) Logit Dynamics [15]:
x˙i(t) =
exp(η−1pi(t))∑n
j=1 exp(η
−1pj(t))
− xi(t) (7)
where pˆ =
(
pˆ1 · · · pˆn
)T
in (5) is the excess payoff vector
defined as pˆ = p− pTx1 and η in (7) is a positive constant.

Associated with Assumption II.2, it can be verified that
all the EDMs described in Example II.3 satisfy the path-
connectedness assumption. For instance, consider the set
S = {(p, x) |x ∈ arg maxy∈X pT y} which is the set
of equilibrium points of (5) and (6). It can be verified
that if both (p0, x) and (p1, x) belong to S then so does
(λp0 + (1− λ)p1, x) for all λ in [0, 1].
B. Passivity and Stability
As it will be presented in Section III, passivity of EDMs
allows us to construct an energy function which can be used
to identify asymptotes of population state trajectories induced
by EDMs in a class of population games. This observation
naturally explains asymptotic stability of equilibrium points
of EDMs.
After we present our main results on passivity, we show
how passivity is connected to stability in population games
and provide numerical simulation results to illustrate the
stability. We defer to a future extension of this paper for
in-depth stability analysis for passive EDMs in a large class
of population games.
III. δ-PASSIVITY OF EVOLUTIONARY DYNAMIC MODEL
We proceed with defining δ-passivity of EDMs, and then
characterize δ-passivity conditions in terms of the vector
field V in (3). Using the characterization, we examine δ-
passivity of representative EDMs in the literature and explore
important properties of δ-passive EDMs.
A. Definition of δ-Passivity
Given an EDM (3) with a payoff vector trajectory p(·) ∈ P
and a resulting population state trajectory x(·) ∈ X, consider
the following inequality: For t ≥ t0 ≥ 0,∫ t
t0
[
p˙T (τ)x˙(τ)− ηx˙T (τ)x˙(τ)] dτ
≥ S(p(t), x(t))− S(p(t0), x(t0)) (8)
where S : Rn × X → R+ is a C1 function and η is a non-
negative constant. Using (8), we state the definition of δ-
passivity as follows.
Definition III.1: Given an EDM (3), we consider the
following two cases:
1) The EDM is δ-passive if there is a C1 function S for
which (8) holds with η = 0 for every p(·) in P.
2) The EDM is strictly output δ-passive with index η > 0
if there is a C1 function S for which (8) holds for every
p(·) in P.3
We refer to S as a storage function. The function S de-
scribes the energy stored in the EDM, and the δ-passivity
inequality (8) suggests that the variation in the stored energy
S(p(t), x(t)) − S(p(t0), x(t0)) is upper bounded by the
supplied energy
∫ t
t0
[p˙T (τ)x˙(τ)− ηx˙T (τ)x˙(τ)] dτ .
We adopt the following definition of a strict storage
function.
Definition III.2: Let S : Rn × X → R+ be a storage
function of a δ-passive EDM (3). We call S strict if the
following condition holds: For all (p, x) in Rn × X,
∇TxS(p, x)V(p, x) = 0 if and only if V(p, x) = 0 (9)
B. Characterization of δ-Passivity Condition
Let us consider the following relations: For (p, x) in
Rn × X,
∇pS(p, x) = V(p, x) (P1)
∇TxS(p, x)V(p, x) ≤ −ηVT (p, x)V(p, x) (P2)
where S : Rn×X→ R+ is a C1 function, V : Rn×X→ TX
is the vector field in (3), and η is a non-negative constant. In
the following theorem, using (P1) and (P2), we characterize
the δ-passivity condition.
Theorem III.3: For a given EDM (3), the following two
statements are true:
1) The EDM is δ-passive if there is a C1 function S
satisfying (P1) and (P2) with η = 0.
2) The EDM is strictly output δ-passive with index η > 0
if there is a C1 function S satisfying (P1) and (P2).
The proof of Theorem III.3 is given in Appendix A.
The following are interpretations of the conditions (P1)
and (P2). The condition (P1) ensures that the integral∫
P
V(p, x) ·dp does not depend on the choice of the path P .
This condition is an important requirement in establishing
stability [16]. The condition (P2) implies that with the
payoff vector fixed, the population state x(t) evolves along a
trajectory for which the function S decreases. This condition
plays an important role in identifying stable equilibria of
EDMs.
C. Assessment of δ-Passivity
Using Theorem III.3, we evaluate δ-passivity of the fol-
lowing four EDMs. The definition of a revision protocol
given below is used to describe some of the EDMs.
3It immediately follows from Definition III.1 that strict output δ-passivity
implies δ-passivity.
Definition III.4: A function % = (%1 · · · %n)T is called
the revision protocol in which each entry %i is defined as
%i : Rn → R+.
1) Replicator Dynamics [4]: For each i in {1, · · · , n},
x˙i(t) = xi(t)
(
pi(t)− pT (t)x(t)
)
(10)
Proposition III.5: The EDM (10) is not δ-passive.
2) Excess Payoff/Target (EPT) Dynamics [17]: For each
i in {1, · · · , n},
x˙i(t) = %i(pˆ(t))− xi(t)1T %(pˆ(t)) (11)
where pˆ is the excess payoff vector defined as pˆ = p−pTx1,
and the revision protocol % = (%1 · · · %n)T satisfies the
following two conditions – Integrability (I) and Acuteness
(A):
∇pˆγ(pˆ) = %(pˆ) (I)
pˆT %(pˆ) > 0 if pˆ ∈ Rn \ Rn− (A)
where γ : Rn → R is a C1 function. Note that (5) is a
particular case of (11). The following proposition establishes
δ-passivity of (11).
Proposition III.6: The EDM (11) is δ-passive and has a
strict storage function given by S(p, x) = γ(pˆ) where γ :
Rn → R+ is a non-negative C1 function satisfying (I).4
3) Pairwise Comparison Dynamics [18]: For each i in
{1, · · · , n},
x˙i(t) =
n∑
j=1
xj(t)%i(pi(t)− pj(t))
− xi(t)
n∑
j=1
%j(pj(t)− pi(t)) (12)
The revision protocol % = (%1 · · · %n)T satisfies the
following condition – Sign Preservation (SP):5
sgn(%i(pi − pj)) = sgn([pi − pj ]+) (SP)
Note that (6) is a particular case of (12). The following
proposition establishes δ-passivity of (12)
Proposition III.7: [11] The EDM (12) is δ-passive and
has a strict storage function given by
S(p, x) =
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
xi
∫ pj−pi
0
%j(s) ds
4The condition (I) only ensures the existence of a C1 function γ which
would be negative. However, in the proof of Proposition III.6, based on
Assumption II.2 we show that there is a choice of γ that is non-negative
and satisfies (I).
5The function sgn : R → {−1, 0, 1} is defined as
sgn(a)
def
=

1 if a > 0
0 if a = 0
−1 if a < 0
.
4) Perturbed Best Response (PBR) Dynamics [15]:
x˙(t) = C(p(t))− x(t) (13)
The function C : Rn → X is defined as C(p) =
arg maxy∈int(X)
(
pT y − v(y)) where v : X → R is a C2
function satisfying the following two conditions:6
zT∇2xv(x)z > 0 for all (x, z) in X× TX \ {0}
‖∇xv(x)‖ → ∞ as x→ bd(X)
We refer to such C and v as the choice function and (deter-
ministic) perturbation, respectively. Note that (7) is a particu-
lar case of (13) with the perturbation v(x) = η
∑n
i=1 xi lnxi.
The following proposition establishes δ-passivity of (13).
Proposition III.8: The EDM (13) is δ-passive and has a
strict storage function given by
S(p, x) = max
y∈int(X)
(
pT y − v(y))− (pTx− v(x)) (14)
If v satisfies the following strong convexity condition then
the EDM is strictly output δ-passive with index η > 0:
zT∇2xv(x)z ≥ ηzT z for all (x, z) in X× TX
The proofs of Propositions III.5, III.6, and III.8 are given
in Appendix A, whereas the proof of Proposition III.7 is
presented in [11].
IV. PROPERTIES OF δ-PASSIVE EVOLUTIONARY
DYNAMIC MODELS
A. Payoff Monotonicity
Let us consider the following two conditions [10], [19] –
Nash Stationarity (NS) and Positive Correlation (PC):
V (p, x) = 0 if and only if x ∈ arg max
y∈X
pT y (NS)
pTV(p, x) ≥ 0 holds for all (p, x) ∈ Rn × X (PC)
We refer to EDMs satisfying both (NS) and (PC) as
payoff monotonic. Examples of payoff monotonic EDMs are
those for the EPT dynamics (11) and pairwise comparison
dynamics (12). To provide an intuition behind payoff mono-
tinicity, consider a payoff monotonic EDM with a constant
payoff p(t) = p0 for all t in R+. The population state x(t)
induced by the EDM evolves along the direction x˙(t) that
monotonically increases the average payoff, and it becomes
stationary when it reaches the state that attains the maximum
average payoff.
The following two propositions characterize important
properties of δ-passive EDMs in connection with payoff
monotonicity.
Proposition IV.1: For a given δ-passive EDM, let S be
its storage function and S = {(p, x) | V(p, x) = 0} be its
equilibrium points. It holds that {(p, x) | S(p, x) = 0} ⊆ S
where the equality holds if the EDM satisfies (NS).
Proposition IV.2: Suppose that n ≥ 3. No EDM can be
both strictly output δ-passive and payoff monotonic.
6Note that there is a unique y in int(X) for which pT y − v(y) is
maximized.
The proofs of Propositions IV.1 and IV.2 are given in
Appendix B.
The following corollary is a direct consequence of Propo-
sition IV.2.
Corollary IV.3: The EDMs (11) and (12) are not strictly
output δ-passive.
The proof of Corollary IV.3 directly follows from Proposi-
tion IV.2 and the fact that (11) and (12) are payoff monotonic.
In Section V, we demonstrate asymptotic stability of
equilibrium points of δ-passive EDMs in population games
where we will observe that strictly output δ-passive EDMs
achieve the stability in a larger class of population games
than do (ordinary) δ-passive EDMs. Besides, the payoff
monotonicity ensures that the population state x(t) evolves
toward Nash equilibria. Based on these observations, strict
output δ-passivity and payoff monotonicty are desired at-
tributes of EDMs; however, Proposition IV.2 states that these
two attributes are not compatible.
B. Effect of Total Payoff Perturbation
Motivated by our analysis on the PBR dynamics in Sec-
tion III-C.4, we investigate the effect of perturbation on δ-
passivity of EDMs. For this purpose, consider the total payoff
function u : Rn × X→ R defined by
u(p, x) = pTx− v(x) (15)
where v : X → R is a C2 function satisfying the following
two conditions:
zT∇2xv(x)z ≥ ηzT z for all (x, z) in X× TX (16a)
‖∇xv(x)‖ → ∞ as x→ bd(X) (16b)
where η is a positive constant. We refer to v as deterministic
perturbation [20] or control cost [21]. Notice that without
the perturbation (v = 0), the total payoff (15) coincides with
the average payoff pTx.7
In what follows, we investigate the effect of perturbation
using a certain class of EDMs whose state-space represen-
tation is given as follows:8
x˙i(t) =
n∑
j=1
xj(t)%˜ji(∇Tx u(p(t), x(t))ξji(x(t)))
− xi(t)
n∑
j=1
%˜ij(∇Tx u(p(t), x(t))ξij(x(t))) (17)
where the function ξji : X→ TX assigns a tangent vector to
each x in X, and %˜ji : Rn → Rn is called a revision protocol
which depends on a directional derivative of the total payoff.
We refer to (17) as perturbed if the perturbation v satisfies
the conditions (16), and as unperturbed if v = 0.
7The idea of imposing perturbations on the average payoff appeared in
game theory and economics to investigate the effect of random perturbations
or disutility on choice models [15], [20], [21], to model human choice
behavior [22], and to analyze the effect of social norms in economic
problems [23].
8We note that the EDM of the PBR dynamics is not of the form (17), and
our analysis given in Section IV-B complements the δ-passivity analysis on
the PBR dynamics.
The following are examples of (17).
x˙i(t) =
[∇Tx u(p(t), x(t)) (ei − x(t))]+
− xi(t)
n∑
j=1
[∇Tx u(p(t), x(t)) (ej − x(t))]+ (18)
x˙i(t) =
n∑
j=1
xj(t)
[∇Tx u(p(t), x(t)) (ei − ej)]+
− xi(t)
n∑
j=1
[∇Tx u(p(t), x(t)) (ej − ei)]+ (19)
Note that the unperturbed EDMs (18) and (19) coincide with
(5) and (6), respectively. Thus, according to Propositions III.6
and III.7, with v = 0, (18) and (19) are δ-passive EDMs. For
the case where v satisfies (16), the perturbed EDMs (18) and
(19) are strictly output δ-passive with index η > 0.
In the following proposition, we generalize this observa-
tion using (17).
Proposition IV.4: Given an EDM (17), suppose that the
EDM is δ-passive when v = 0. If v satisfies (16), then the
perturbed EDM (17) is strictly output δ-passive with index
η > 0.
The proof is given in Appendix C.
V. STABILITY OF δ-PASSIVE EVOLUTIONARY DYNAMIC
MODELS
In this section, we investigate how δ-passivity is connected
to asymptotic stability in population games.
A. Stability in Population Games
Consider the following closed-loop configuration of a
static payoff function (1) and δ-passive EDM (3):
x˙(t) = V(F(x(t)), x(t)) (20)
where the C1 mapping F : X → Rn satisfies zTDF(x)z ≤
zT z with  ≥ 0 for all (x, z) in X × TX, and the storage
function S of the EDM is strict. The following proposition
establishes asymptotic stability of the equilibrium points
{x ∈ X | V(F(x), x) = 0} of (20).
Proposition V.1: Consider the closed-loop (20). The equi-
librium points of (20) are asymptotically stable if either of
the following conditions holds:
1) The EDM (3) is δ-passive and  = 0.
2) The EDM (3) is strictly output δ-passive with index η
and it holds that η >  > 0.
The proof of Proposition V.1 is given in Appendix D.
Note that under (NS), Proposition V.1 essentially establishes
asymptotic stability of Nash equilibria of F .
Proposition V.1 shows that δ-passivity is a sufficient con-
dition for stability in population games with static payoff
functions (1). In what follows, we investigate whether δ-
passivity is also a necessary condition for stability. To this
end, let us consider the following closed-loop configuration
of a variant of the smoothed payoff (2) and an EDM (3)
satisfying (NS):
p˙(t) = F˜(x(t))− 1
n
11T p(t) (21a)
x˙(t) = V(p(t), x(t)) (21b)
where F˜ : int(X) → Rn is defined by F˜(x) =
∇x
(
f(x) +
∑n
i=1 xi ln
ai
xi
)
with a C1 concave function
f : X→ R and positive constants {ai}ni=1.
Note that F˜ can be interpreted as a perturbed payoff func-
tion in a concave potential game in which the perturbation
is described by
∑n
i=1 xi ln
ai
xi
. At a stationary point (p, x)
of (21a), the population state x is a Nash equilibrium of
the game9 which satisfies the following relation: x ∈ X is a
stationary point of (21a) if and only if
xi > 0 implies i ∈ arg max
j∈{1,··· ,n}
F˜j(x)
In the following proposition, we show that δ-passivity
of EDMs is equivalent to Lyapunov stability in population
games with the smoothed payoff (21a).
Proposition V.2: Consider the closed-loop (21). The EDM
(21b) is δ-passive and its storage function is strict if and only
if for every smoothed payoff (21a), there exists an energy
function E : Rn × X→ R+ for which the following holds:
1) E(p, x) = S(p, x) + maxy∈int(X) f˜(y)− f˜(x).
2) ddtE(p(t), x(t)) ≤ 0 where the equality holds if and
only if x(t) ∈ arg maxy∈X pT (t)y.
where S is a fixed C1 function and f˜ is defined by f˜(x) =
f(x) +
∑n
i=1 xi ln
ai
xi
for each x in X.
The proof of Proposition V.2 is given in Appendix D.
In fact, 1) and 2) of Proposition V.2 yield asymptotic
stability of the Nash equilibrium of F˜ . To make the argument
simple, let’s suppose that x(t) stays in a compact subset of
int(X) for all t in R+, which ensures that the payoff p(t)
also stays in a compact subset of Rn.
Note that E is a Lyapunov function which ensures that
the closed-loop (21) satisfies the Lyapunov stability criterion
[24]. In particular, if E(p(t), x(t)) = 0 then x(t) is the
Nash equilibrium of F˜ and p(t) = 1a(t) for a real number
a(t), and due to the payoff dynamics (21a), p(t) converges
to F˜(x(t)). In addition, due to 2) of Proposition V.2, the
value of E(p(t), x(t)) decreases unless p(t) = 1a(t) for
a real number a(t); on the other hand, unless x(t) is the
Nash equilibrium of F˜ , the payoff dynamics (21a) would
not allow p(t) = 1a(t) and E(p(t), x(t)) keeps decreasing.
The above two observations yield asymptotic stability of
(F˜(xNE), xNE) under (21) where xNE is the Nash equilib-
rium of F˜ .
B. Numerical Simulations
Through numerical simulations with n = 3, we evaluate
stability of EDMs in population games. We consider two
scenarios where in the first scenario, we consider the BNN
9Note that due to the perturbation
∑n
i=1 xi ln
ai
xi
, Nash equilibrium is
in the interior of X.
dynamics (5) and the logit dynamics (7) in the Hypnodisk
game [19] whose static payoff function is given by
p(t) = H(x(t)) (22)
The mapping H = (H1,H2,H3) is defined byH1(x1, x2, x3)H2(x1, x2, x3)
H3(x1, x2, x3)

= cos (θ(x1, x2, x3))
x1 − 13x2 − 13
x3 − 13

+
√
3
3
sin (θ(x1, x2, x3))
x2 − x3x3 − x1
x1 − x2
+ 1
3
11
1

where θ(x1, x2, x3) = pi
[
1− b
(∑3
i=1
∣∣xi − 13 ∣∣2)] and b is
a function satisfying
1) b(r) = 1 if r ≤ R2I
2) b(r) = 0 if r ≥ R2O
3) b(r) is decreasing if R2I < r < R
2
O
with RI = 0.1 and RO = 0.4.
It can be verified that there is a constant η > 0 for (7) for
which 2) in Proposition V.1 holds and the population state
x(t) converges to the Nash equilibrium of
H˜(x) = H(x) +
− lnx1 − 1− lnx2 − 1
− lnx3 − 1

However, Proposition V.1 does not apply to (5). Simulation
results given in Fig. 1 (a)-(b) illustrate that the population
state trajectories of (7) under (22) converge to the Nash
equilibrium of H˜ whereas those of (5) do not.
In the second scenario, we compare stability of the repli-
cator dynamics (4) and the BNN dynamics (5) using the
smoothed payoff (21a) where the mapping F˜ is defined by
F˜(x) =
−x1−x2
−x3
+
− lnx1 − 1− lnx2 − 1
− lnx3 − 1

Note that according to Proposition V.2 and δ-passivity of
(5), we can construct a Lyapunov function E and establish
asymptotic stability of the Nash equilibrium of F˜ whereas (4)
is not δ-passive (see Proposition III.5) and Proposition V.2
does not apply to (4). Simulation results given in Fig. 1 (c)-
(d) illustrate that the population state trajectory of (5) under
(21a) converges to the Nash equilibrium of F˜ whereas that
of (4) oscillates around the Nash equilibrium.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have investigated δ-passivity of dynamic
models in evolutionary game theory. We defined and char-
acterized δ-passivity using the state-space representation of
EDMs. Based on the characterization, we studied certain
properties of δ-passive EDMs and demonstrated how δ-
passivity can be used to establish stability in population
games. As future work, it would be interesting to further
(a) Multiple population state trajectories induced by the BNN dynamics with different initial
conditions in the Hypnodisk game; and the storage function evaluated along a population state
trajectory.
(b) Multiple population state trajectories induced by the logit dynamics with different initial
conditions in the Hypnodisk game; and the storage function evaluated along a population state
trajectory.
(c) A single population state trajectory induced by the replicator dynamics with smoothed payoff;
and the KL divergence E(x(t)) = ∑3i=1 xi(t) ln xNEixi(t) evaluated along the trajectory, where
xNE = 1
3
1.
(d) A single population state trajectory induced the BNN dynamics with smoothed payoff; and the
storage function evaluated along the trajectory.
Fig. 1. Simulation results that illustrate asymptotic stability in population games.
investigate stability of EDMs in a generalized class of
population games in which diverse higher-order dynamics
and/or delay are involved.
APPENDIX
A. Proofs of Theorem III.3 and Propositions III.5, III.6, and
III.8
1) Proof of Theorem III.3: The definition of δ-passivity
in Definition III.1 is closely related with the notion of
dissipativity in dynamical system theory [25]. To see this,
let us rewrite (3) in the following form:
x˙(t) = V(u(t), x(t)) (23a)
y˙(t) = x˙(t) (23b)
Note that (23) can be interpreted as a state-space equation for
a control-affine nonlinear system with the input u˙(t), state
(u(t), x(t)), and output y˙(t). According to the definition of
dissipativity [25], the system (23) is dissipative with respect
to the supply rate s(u˙, y˙) = u˙T y˙ − ηy˙T y˙ with a constant η
if there is a C1 function S : Rn × X→ R+ for which∫ t
t0
[
u˙T (τ)y˙(τ)− ηy˙T (τ)y˙(τ)] dτ
≥ S(p(t), x(t))− S(p(t0), x(t0)) (24)
holds for all t ≥ t0 ≥ 0 and u(·) ∈ P. Then, by the
equivalence between (3) and (23), we can verify that the δ-
passivity condition is satisfied for (3) if there is a C1 function
S for which (24) holds with η ≥ 0 for every u(·) in P.
Based on the above observation, using the dissipativity
characterization theorem (see, for instance, Theorem 1 in
[26]), we can see that there is a C1 function S satisfying
(P1) and (P2) with η ≥ 0 if and only if under the same
choice of S, the δ-passivity inequality (8) holds with the
same choice of η for all t ≥ t0 ≥ 0 and all p(·) in P.
2) Proof of Proposition III.5: We proceed by showing that
any C1 function S : Rn ×X→ R+ satisfying (P1) does not
satisfy the condition (P2) under (10). Using Theorem III.3,
we conclude that (10) is not passive.
Let us re-write (10) in the following form:
x˙i(t) =
n∑
j=1
xi(t)xj(t) (pi(t)− pj(t)) (25)
Note that any C1 function S satisfying (P1) should be of
the following form:
S(p, x) = 1
4
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
xixj(pi − pj)2 + g(x)
where g : X → R+ is a C1 function. By taking a partial
derivative of S with respect to x, we obtain (26). Let us
choose xj = 0 for all j ≥ 3. Then, we obtain (27).
Note that for fixed x1, x2 (except for the points at which
∇TxS(p, x)V(p, x) = 0 holds for all p in Rn), there exists
p ∈ Rn for which ∇TxS(p, x)V(p, x) > 0 holds. Therefore,
the function S does not satisfy (P2). Since we made an
arbitrary choice of S, we conclude that there does not exist
a C1 function S that satisfies (P1) and (P2) simultaneously.
3) Proof of Proposition III.6: We first note that the
condition (A) implies the so-called Strict Positive Correlation
(SPC) [17] described as follows:
V(p, x) 6= 0 implies pTV(p, x) > 0 (SPC)
Let γ : Rn → R be a C1 function for which (I) holds. It
can be verified that γ satisfies
∇pγ(pˆ) = V(p, x) (28a)
∇Tx γ(pˆ)V(p, x) = −
(
1T %(pˆ)
) (
pTV(p, x)) (28b)
where pˆ = p − pTx1. Let us select a candidate storage
function as S(p, x) = γ(pˆ). Due to (28a), the function S
satisfies (P1). In conjunction with the fact that %(pˆ) = 0
implies V(p, x) = 0, due to (SPC) and (28b), we can see
that (P2) holds with η = 0 and the equality in (P2) holds
only if V(p, x) = 0.
Suppose that γ also satisfies the following inequality for
every pˆ in Rn:
γ(pˆ) ≥ γ(0) (29)
Then, without loss of generality by setting γ(0) = 0,
we conclude that S(p, x) = γ(pˆ) is non-negative and in
conjunction with aforementioned arguments, the EDM (11)
is δ-passive where its storage function is strict and is given
by S(p, x) = γ(pˆ). In what follows, we show that (29) is
valid for every pˆ in Rn.
We first claim that (29) holds for all (p, x) in the set S of
equilibrium points of (11). To see this, first note that due to
(SPC), it holds that V(0, x) = 0, i.e., 0 ∈ Sx, for all x in
X. By (28a), for fixed x in X, the following equality holds
for all p in Rn:
γ (pˆ) = γ (0) +
∫ 1
0
p˙T (s)V(p(s), x) ds (30)
where p : [0, 1]→ Rn is a parameterization of a piece-wise
smooth path from 0 to p and pˆ = p−pTx1. According to the
path-connectedness assumption (Assumption II.2), for each
p in Sx, there is a path from 0 to p in which the entire path
is contained in Sx, i.e., V(p(s), x) = 0 holds for all s in
[0, 1]; hence the following equality holds for every p in Sx:
γ (pˆ)− γ (0) =
∫ 1
0
p˙T (s)V(p(s), x) ds = 0 (31)
Since (31) holds for every (p, x) in S, this proves the claim.
To see that (29) extends to the entire domain Rn × X,
by contradiction, let us assume that there is (p′, x′) /∈ S
for which S(p′, x′) = γ(pˆ′) < γ(0) holds. Let x(t) be the
population state induced by (11) with the initial condition
x(0) = x′ and the constant payoff p(t) = p′ for all t in
R+. By (SPC) and (28b), the value of S(p′, x(t)) is strictly
decreasing unless V(p′, x(t)) = 0. By the hypothesis that
S(p′, x′) < γ(0) and by (31), for every (p, x) in S, it holds
that S(p′, x′) < S(p, x) and the state (p(t), x(t)) never
∇TxS(p, x)V(p, x) =


1
2
∑n
j=1 xj(p1 − pj)2
...
1
2
∑n
j=1 xj(pn − pj)2
+∇xg(x)

T 
∑n
j=1 x1xj(p1 − pj)
...∑n
j=1 xnxj(pn − pj)
 (26)
∇TxS(p, x)V(p, x) =
(
1
2x2(p1 − p2)2 + ∂g∂x1 (x)
1
2x1(p1 − p2)2 + ∂g∂x2 (x)
)T (
x1x2(p1 − p2)
−x1x2(p1 − p2)
)
= −1
2
x1x2(p1 − p2)
[
(x1 − x2)(p1 − p2)2 + 2
(
∂g
∂x2
(x)− ∂g
∂x1
(x)
)]
(27)
converges to S. On the other hand, by LaSalle’s Theorem
[24], since p(t) is constant and the population state x(t) is
contained in a compact set, x(t) converges to an invariant
subset of
{
x ∈ X ∣∣∇TxS(p′, x)V(p′, x) = 0}. By (SPC) and
(28b), the invariant subset is contained in S. This contradicts
the fact that the state (p(t), x(t)) does not converge to S;
hence γ(pˆ) ≥ γ(0) holds for all (p, x) in Rn × X.
4) Proof of Proposition III.8: The analysis used in The-
orem 2.1 of [20] suggests that the following hold:
zT∇p
[
max
y∈int(X)
(pT y − v(y))
]
= zTC(p) (32a)
zT∇xv(x) = zT p if and only if x = C(p) (32b)
for all (p, x, z) in Rn×X×TX. Using (32), we can see that
∇pS(p, x) = C(p)− x = V(p, x) (33)
and
∇TxS(p, x)V(p, x) = − (p−∇xv(x))T V(p, x)
= − (∇yv(y)−∇xv(x))T (y − x)
(34)
where y = C(p). By the fact that v is strictly convex, it holds
that ∇TxS(p, x)V(p, x) ≤ 0 where the equality holds only if
V(p, x) = 0. According to Theorem III.3, we conclude that
the EDM (13) is δ-passive and its storage function is strict
and is given by (14).
Furthermore, if the perturbation v satisfies zT∇2xv(x)z ≥
ηzT z for all (x, z) in X×TX, i.e., v is strongly convex, then
it holds that (∇yv(y)−∇xv(x))T (y − x) ≥ η ‖y − x‖2 for
all x, y in X. Using (34) we can derive ∇TxS(p, x)V(p, x) ≤
−ηVT (p, x)V(p, x). Hence, by Theorem III.3, we conclude
that (13) is strictly output δ-passive with index η.
B. Proofs of Propositions IV.1 and IV.2
1) Proof of Proposition IV.1: The first part of the state-
ment directly follows from the condition (P1) and the fact
that at a global minimizer (p∗, x∗) of S, it holds that
∇pS(p∗, x∗) = 0. Now suppose that the EDM satisfies (NS).
To prove the second statement, it is sufficient to show that at
each equilibrium point (p, x) of (3), it holds that S(p, x) = 0.
To this end, let us consider an anti-coordination game whose
payoff function is given by Fxo(x) = −(x− xo) for a fixed
xo in X. Notice that xo is a unique Nash equilibrium of the
game. In what follows, we show that S(po, xo) = 0 holds
for any choice of xo from X and po from Sxo .
Let (p∗, x∗) be a global minimizer of S, i.e., S (p∗, x∗) =
0. By the first part of the statement and (NS), we have that
V(p∗s, x∗) = 0 for all s in R+; hence it holds that
S(0, x∗) = S(p∗, x∗)−
∫ 1
0
(p∗)T V(p∗s, x∗) ds = 0
By the continuity of S, for each  > 0 there exists δ > 0 for
which S (δFxo(x∗), x∗) <  holds.
According to the conditions (P1) and (P2) with η = 0, the
following relation holds for every positive constant δ:
d
dt
S(δFxo(x(t)), x(t))
≤ δVT (δFxo(x(t)), x(t))DFx0(x(t))V(δFxo(x(t)), x(t))
= −δ ‖V (δFxo(x(t)), x(t))‖2 (35)
Suppose that the population state x(t) induced by (3) in
the anti-coordination game starts from x(0) = x∗. By an
application of LaSalle’s theorem [24] and by (NS), we
can verify that (δFxo(x(t)), x(t)) converges to (0, xo) as
t→∞. In addition, due to (35), we have that
S (0, xo) ≤ S (δFx0(x∗), x∗) < 
Since this holds for every  > 0, we conclude that S(0, xo) =
0. By the fact that V(pos, xo) = 0 for all s in R+ if po
belongs to Sxo , we can see that the following equality holds
for every po in Sxo :
S(po, xo) = S(0, xo) +
∫ 1
0
pTo V(pos, xo) ds = 0 (36)
Since we made an arbitrary choice of xo from X in con-
structing the anti-coordination game, we conclude that (36)
holds for every (po, xo) in S. This proves the proposition.
2) Proof of Proposition IV.2: We first construct a game
Fν based on the Hypnodisk game [19], which is described
by the following payoff function: For a1, a2, a3 in R+,H1(a1, a2, a3)H2(a1, a2, a3)
H3(a1, a2, a3)

= cos (θ(a1, a2, a3))
a1 − 13a2 − 13
a3 − 13

+
√
3
3
sin (θ(a1, a2, a3))
a2 − a3a3 − a1
a1 − a2
+ 1
3
11
1

where θ(a1, a2, a3) = pi
[
1− b
(∑3
i=1
∣∣ai − 13 ∣∣2)] and b is
a bump function that satisfies
1) b(r) = 1 if r ≤ R2I
2) b(r) = 0 if r ≥ R2O
3) b(r) is decreasing if R2I < r < R
2
O
with 0 < RI < RO < 1√6 .
Now consider a payoff function F ′ = (F ′1 · · · F ′n)T
defined as follows: For each i in {1, · · · , n},
F ′i(x) =
{
Hj(x1, x2, x3 + · · ·+ xn) if j ∈ {1, 2}
H3(x1, x2, x3 + · · ·+ xn) otherwise
(37)
Note that the set of Nash equilibria of F ′ is given as follows:{
x ∈ X
∣∣∣∣x1 = x2 = x3 + · · ·+ xn = 13
}
(38)
Since θ is a smooth function, F ′ is continuously differen-
tiable and its differential map DF ′ is bounded, i.e., for some
δ > 0, it holds that zTDF ′(x)z < δzT z for all (x, z) in
X × TX. Finally, for a given constant ν > 0, we define a
new payoff function by Fν = νδF ′.
Using the payoff function Fν , we prove the statement
of the proposition. By contradiction, suppose that there is
an EDM that is both strictly output δ-passive and payoff
monotonic. By definition, the EDM satisfies the δ-passivity
condition with index η > 0. Under the payoff function Fν
for which ν < η holds, the time-derivative of the storage
function S(Fν(x(t)), x(t)) satisfies the following inequality:
d
dt
S(Fν(x(t)), x(t)) ≤ −(η − ν) ‖V(Fν(x(t)), x(t))‖2
By an application of LaSalle’s theorem [24] and by (NS), we
can verify that the population state trajectory x(·) induced by
the EDM under Fν converges to the set of Nash equilibria
(38) as t→∞.
On the other hand, when x(t) is contained in the set{
x ∈ X
∣∣∣∣∣
(
x1 − 1
3
)2
+
(
x2 − 1
3
)2
+
(
x3 + · · ·+ xn − 1
3
)2
≤ R2I
}
by (PC), it holds that
FTν (x(t))V(Fν(x(t)), x(t))
=
ν
2δ
d
dt
[(
x1(t)− 1
3
)2
+
(
x2(t)− 1
3
)2
+
(
x3(t) + · · ·+ xn(t)− 1
3
)2]
≥ 0
(39)
Hence, the population state x(t) never converges to the set of
Nash equilibria. This is a contradiction; hence, EDMs cannot
be both strictly output δ-passive and payoff monotonic.
C. Proof of Proposition IV.4
Since the EDM (17) is δ-passive if v = 0, by Theo-
rem III.3, we can find a storage function S : Rn ×X→ R+
for which the conditions (P1) and (P2) hold for η = 0. In
what follows, we show that when the perturbation v satisfies
(16), the resulting perturbed EDM is strictly output δ-passive
with a storage function S˜(p, x) def= S (p−∇xv(x), x).
By definition, we have that
∇p˘iS (p˘, x) =
n∑
j=1
xj %˜ji(p˘
T ξji(x))− xi
n∑
j=1
%˜ij(p˘
T ξij(x))
def
= Vi(p˘, x) (40)
Note that (17) can be concisely written as
x˙i(t) = Vi(p˘, x)
∣∣
p˘=p−∇xv(x)
Using V(p˘, x) = (V1(p˘, x) · · · Vn(p˘, x))T , we can com-
pute the gradient of S˜ with respect to p and x as follows:
∇pS˜ (p, x) = ∇p˘S (p˘, x)
∣∣∣
p˘=p−∇xv(x)
= V (p−∇xv(x), x) (41)
∇xS˜(p, x) = ∇Tx (p−∇xv(x)) ∇p˘S(p˘, x)
∣∣∣
p˘=p−∇xv(x)
+∇xS(p˘, x)
∣∣∣
p˘=p−∇xv(x)
= − (∇2xv(x))T V (p−∇xv(x), x)
+∇xS(p˘, x)
∣∣∣
p˘=p−∇xv(x)
(42)
Using (42), we can derive the following:
∇Tx S˜(p, x)V (p−∇xv(x), x)
= −VT (p−∇xv(x), x)∇2xv(x)V (p−∇xv(x), x)
+∇TxS(p˘, x)V(p˘, x)
∣∣∣
p˘=p−∇xv(x)
≤ −VT (p−∇xv(x), x)∇2xv(x)V (p−∇xv(x), x) (43)
where the inequality holds due to δ-passivity of the unper-
turbed EDM. Since v satisfies zT∇2xv(x)z ≥ ηzT z for all
(x, z) in X×TX with η > 0, from (43), we can see that the
following inequality holds:
∇Tx S˜(p, x)V (p−∇xv(x), x)
≤ −ηVT (p−∇xv(x), x)V (p−∇xv(x), x)
Hence, using Theorem III.3, we conclude that the perturbed
EDM is strictly output δ-passive and its storage function is
given by S˜.
D. Proofs of Propositions V.1 and V.2
1) Proof of Proposition V.1: By taking a time-derivative
of the strict storage function S, we can derive the following
relation:
d
dt
S(F(x(t)), x(t))
≤ x˙T (t)DF(x(t))x˙(t)
− ηVT (F(x(t)), x(t))V(F(x(t)), x(t)) (44)
Note that according to LaSalle’s Theorem [24], if either 1)
or 2) of the statement holds, then the population state x(t)
of (20) converges to the equilibrium points of (20). Beside
Lyapunov stability directly follows from the fact that under
1) or 2) of the statement, ddtS(F(x(t)), x(t)) ≤ 0 holds.
2) Proof of Proposition V.2: The sufficiency directly
follows using Theorem III.3, Proposition IV.1, and a strict
storage function S of the EDM. To prove the necessity, we
proceed with computing the derivative of the function E as
follows:
d
dt
E(p(t), x(t))
= ∇Tp S(p(t), x(t))p˙(t) +∇TxS(p(t), x(t))x˙(t)− F˜T (x(t))x˙(t)
= ∇Tp S(p(t), x(t))
[
F˜(x(t))− 1
n
11T p(t)
]
+∇TxS(p(t), x(t))V(p(t), x(t))
−
[
F˜(x(t))− 1
n
11T p(t)
]T
V(p(t), x(t))
= [∇pS(p(t), x(t))− V(p(t), x(t))]T
[
F˜(x(t))− 1
n
11T p(t)
]
+∇TxS(p(t), x(t))V(p(t), x(t)) (45)
where we use the fact that 1TV(p, x) = 0 for all (p, x) in
Rn × X.
Let us select f˜(x) =
∑n
i=1 xi ln
ai
xi
and define p(t) =
1
n1
T p(t). Then, from (45), we can derive the following
relation:
d
dt
E(p(t), x(t))
= [∇pS(p(t), x(t))− V(p(t), x(t))]T

ln a1x1 − 1− p(t)
...
ln aixi − 1− p(t)
...
ln anxn − 1− p(t)

+∇TxS(p(t), x(t))V(p(t), x(t))
Recall that the constant ai can be any positive real number
and the image of ln ai is (−∞,∞). Based on this observation
for any (p(t), x(t)) in Rn × int(X), we can select the
constants {ai}ni=1 for which ddtE(p(t), x(t)) > 0 unless∇pS(p(t), x(t)) = V(p(t), x(t)). Hence, by the continuity
of ∇pS and V , we have that ∇pS(p, x) = V(p, x) for all
(p, x) in Rn × X. According to (NS) and 2) of Proposition
V.2,∇TxS(p, x)V(p, x) = 0 if and only if V(p, x) = 0. Using
Theorem III.3, we conclude that the EDM is δ-passive with
a strict storage function S.
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